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Actor Network Theory (ANT) is a highly influential account within the
sociology of science that seeks to explain social order not through an
essentialized notion of “the social” but through the networks of connec-
tions among human agents, technologies, and objects. Entities (whether
human or nonhuman) within those networks acquire power through the
number, extensiveness, and stability of the connections routed through
them, and through nothing else. Such connections are contingent and
emerge historically (they are not natural) but, if successful, a network
acquires the force of “nature”: it becomes, in a favorite term of ANT,
black-boxed. On the face of it, ANT seems perfectly placed to generate a
theory of the role(s) of media and communication technologies in con-
temporary societies: these too have emerged historically, yet over more
than a century have acquired the force of nature. Yet this connection
has been surprisingly little explored. This chapter asks why, in an
attempt to understand the substance as well as the limits of ANT’s con-
tribution to how we theorize the connectivities that media enable.
The fact that a stable link between ANT and media theory has
not been established—ironically, ANT is not “networked” with media
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a high profile in the social sciences (as indicated by the wide curren-
cy of We Have Never Been Modern, the main book of one of the ANT
founders, Bruno Latour: Latour, 1993), but in the late 1980s studies
of how media technologies, especially television, are embedded in
domestic and social space were closely aligned with work in the soci-
ology of science and technology influenced by ANT. Particularly
important here was the work of the media sociologist Roger
Silverstone (Silverstone, 1994; Silverstone & Hirsch, 1992), who took
the lead in allying the analysis of television’s domestic integration to
wider currents in sociology that studied the highly specific ways in
which various technologies—from locks to domestic heating—
became embedded in social life from the 19th century onwards.
However, Silverstone dismisses ANT’s term “network” as little more
than a metaphor that fails to displace a more fundamental notion of
“system”; that is, the systems that structure and are structured by
social action. Here is Silverstone’s discussion of another founder of
ANT, the sociologist John Law:
Law prefers the term network to system. . . . In relation to the sys-
tems metaphor, Law suggests that it tends to underestimate the
fragility of the emerging system in the face of the conflictful envi-
ronments and conditions in which it is embedded. . . . In relation to
the construction metaphor, he argues that the privileging of the
social which [that metaphor] demands . . . mistakes the complexi-
ty of the relationships that need to be understood if the emergence
of new technologies is to be explained. . . . However one can grant
this and still privilege the social; indeed one must do so [italics
added], since the natural, the economic and the technical, in their
obduracy or their malleability, have no significance except through
social action. . . . The socio-technical system is therefore just that:
a more or less fragile, more or less secure, concatenation of
human, social and material elements and relations, structured in,
and structuring of, social action . . . from this point of view the
notion of network does not add much to that of system.
(Silverstone, 1994, pp. 84-85)
Here ANT and media theory meet and then quickly diverge. Since this
passage was written there have been occasional acknowledgements of
their potential affinity, especially in relation to computer-mediated com-
munication (Bingham, 1999; Bolter & Grusin, 2000, pp. 50, 62, 67, 77-
78; MacGregor Wise, 1997), but these have not been more widely devel-
oped. On the face of it, this could be for two quite different reasons: first,
that ANT itself is not a substantial or coherent theory and second, that
media pose problems, or set limits, to the applicability of ANT, in spite
of its general value as a theory. If the first were true, this chapter would
be redundant; indeed, whether that is the case would be a matter not
94 Couldry
for media studies but for a more general sociology of technology. I want,
however, to concentrate on the second possibility: taking for granted the
substantial nature of ANT as a sociological theory and being open there-
fore to its contribution to our theorization of media, but also wary of the
limits and constraints. There is, I suspect, something important at stake
in thinking about ANT in media studies, but what exactly is it?
THE CHALLENGE OF ACTOR NETWORK THEORY
ANT starts from the study of science; for example, Latour and Woolgar’s
influential study of laboratory life (1979). From the beginning, ANT
aimed to deconstruct the implicit idealism of traditional sociology of
knowledge: instead of seeing scientific theories and discoveries as ideas
that float mysteriously above the surface of social interaction, Latour
and Woolgar insisted that the results of science are inextricably embed-
ded in what particular scientists do in particular sites of knowledge pro-
duction, such as laboratories. Latour and Woolgar’s deconstruction is so
thorough that it undermines the binary opposition between ideas and
matter itself.
In his later programmatic book We Have Never Been Modern,
Latour rejects also the distinction between an absolute “Society” and an
absolute “Nature”, because everything involves hybrids of the two
(1993, pp. 51-55). ANT is therefore sociology, but in a paradoxical
sense, in that it challenges the existence of sociology’s apparent object:
society or the social. Latour’s point is not that there is no social dimen-
sion to existence, but rather that the social is always already technical,
just as the technical is always already social. Latour’s aim is:
. . . to avoid the twin pitfalls of sociologism and technologism. We are
never faced with objects or social relations, we are faced with chains
which are associations of humans . . . and non-humans. . . . No one
has ever seen a social relation by itself . . . nor a technical relation.
(Latour, 1991, p. 110)
This fundamental skepticism towards both society (or ideas) and tech-
nology (or matter) is, I will argue, a major insight that still resonates for
media theory and can help us avoid the implicit functionalism in much
media theory.
I will provide more context for this claim later, but first we must
address Roger Silverstone’s contrasting argument that the notion of
network adds little to our understanding of the social, or therefore to
our understanding of the social dimensions of technology; for, if correct,
that would fundamentally undermine the usefulness of ANT for media
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theory. Silverstone does not deny that human agents are involved in
regular relationships with media technologies that, in turn, form part
of the infrastructure of wider social relationships; he is concerned,
however, with agency and the necessity (in analyzing the actions and
intentions of human agents) of understanding how they are contextual-
ized by more than networks. Networks, by the particular set of links
they combine, reinforce certain ways of connecting, while effacing
other possibilities, but at most a network sets agents in positions rela-
tive to other agents and things (relative, that is, to other actants, as
ANT calls them, in a term that is deliberately ambiguous between
humans and nonhumans: Latour, 1991, p. 123). Those positions limit
the possibilities of action in certain ways, but they do not tell us about
the dynamics of action. Specifically, the existence of networks does not
explain, or even address, agents’ interpretations of those networks and
their resulting possibilities of action (and it is only human agents that
interpret the world, even if, as Woolgar argued, objects and technolo-
gies have inscribed within them particular codes and instructions for
action: Woolgar, 1991). Networks (and therefore ANT) tell us something
important about the embeddedness of social life in media and commu-
nications technologies, but they do not offer the basis for a completely
new theorization of social order, nor even a new way of analyzing social
action, in spite of claiming to do just that. Or, at least, that is
Silverstone’s argument.
I would not want to disagree with this in one respect. However sug-
gestive are its accounts of how various technologies come to be embed-
ded in social life, ANT does not offer a complete rethinking of society or
sociology, in spite of its programmatic ambitions: we will return to some
of its limitations in the next section. But to stop at those limitations is to
risk missing the continuing importance of ANT’s contribution to media
theory, which is, in a sense, rhetorical: to warn us at all times against
talking as if the everyday workings of media merge seamlessly into the
social. ANT’s insistence on the necessary hybridity of what we call social
relations remains a valuable antidote to the self-effacing, naturalizing
potential of media discourse and of much discourse in media studies. In
the end, this is a question of power. Let me explain.
I have written elsewhere about the problematic functionalism of
much writing in media studies (Couldry, 2005) and will not repeat those
arguments here. Put simply, the issue is the tendency in both academic
and popular writing about media to speak as if media were the social,
as if media were the natural channels of social life and social engage-
ment, rather than highly specific and institutionally focused means for
representing social life and channeling social participation. Take this
example from Michael Real, who wrote important and pioneering work
on the ritual dimensions of media coverage of global sports events such
as the Olympics:
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Media serve as the central nervous system of modern society. The
search to understand these media draws us into a search for the
centre of all that is life in the 20th century. Our media, ourselves.
(Real, 1989, p. 13)
My concern here is not whether this captures some of the rhetoric of
and around media—it does, even if the biological metaphor is Real’s
own—but the apparent lack of distance from that rhetoric.
By contrast, let us consider the much more skeptical tone of the fol-
lowing passage in which Latour considers the nature of global networks
(he doesn’t only have in mind media here, but other passages in the
book make clear he is interested in the properties of media: e.g., 1993,
pp. 1-3):
The moderns have simply invented longer networks by enlisting a
certain type of nonhumans . . . by multiplying the hybrids . . . that
we call machines and facts, collectives have changed their typogra-
phy . . . we tend to transform the lengthened networks of Westerners
into systematic and global totalities. To dispel this mystery, it suffices
to follow the unaccustomed paths that allow this variation of scale,
and to look at networks of facts and laws rather as one looks at gas
lines or sewerage pipes. . . . In the case of technological networks,
we have no difficulty reconciling their local aspect and their global
dimension. They are composed of particular places, aligned by a
series of branchings that cross other places and require other
branchings in order to spread. . . . Technological networks . . . are
nets thrown over spaces, and retain only a few scattered elements of
those spaces. They are connected lines, not surfaces. They are by no
means comprehensive, global, or systematic, even though they
embrace surfaces without covering them and extend a very long
way. (Latour, 1993, pp. 117-118)
A little later, he expresses this anti-idealism in terms of a media
metaphor: “Reason today has more in common with a cable television
network than with Platonic ideas” (1993, p. 119). This anti-idealism is
opposed to various apparently comforting abstractions: not just nature
and society but also culture (1993, p. 104) and (as follows, if we read
Real and Latour together) the mythical notion of media as society.
Indeed the tendency to treat mediation as if it were something else (that
is, to make it invisible as such) is, according to Latour, precisely a fea-
ture of the philosophical framework of modernity he wants to contest.
Mediation (in the general sense of the process of constructing techno-
logical-social hybrids) is both essential to modernity and rendered
“invisible, unthinkable, unrepresentable” within it (1993, p. 34). So the
mystification of media’s social function (which elsewhere I have ana-
lyzed as “the myth of the mediated centre”: Couldry, 2003a) is not acci-
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dental but part of the effacement of technology’s embedding within the
social that is characteristic of modernity itself.
Media studies, when it speaks of media as if media were society (as
it does whenever it thinks in functionalist terms) contributes to this mys-
tifying effacement of the vast linkage of networks that make up the
media process. This mystification is not new: it can be traced back to
some of the earliest theory about media’s social role. To illustrate this,
we can go back to Durkheim’s less well-known contemporary, Gabriel
Tarde, who, like Durkheim, started from the question of social order, or
how we develop our sense of ourselves as social individuals. Unlike
Durkheim, Tarde related this to an analysis of media institutions’ role in
social cohesion:
It is . . . essential that each of the individuals [in a society] be more
or less aware of the similarity of his judgements with those of oth-
ers; for if each one thought himself isolated in his evaluation, none
of them would feel himself to be (and hence would not be) bound in
close association with others like himself. . . . Now, in order for the
consciousness of similarity of ideas to exist among the members of a
society, must not the cause of this similarity be the manifestation in
words, in writing, or in the Press, of an idea that was individual at
first, then little by little generalised? (Tarde, 1969, p. 300) [original-
ly published 1898/99]
For Tarde the equation of media with the social fabric is total and seam-
less:
The press unifies and invigorates conversations, makes them uni-
form in space and diversified in time. Every morning the papers give
their publics the conversations for the day. . . . But this subject
changes every day and every week. . . . This increasing similarity of
simultaneous conversations in an ever more vast geographic domain
is one of the most important characteristics of our time. (1969, p.
312)
This power of media is unstoppable and, it appears, beyond criticism,
because the implicit equation of media and the social is not questioned:
“This is an enormous power, one that can only increase, because the
need to agree with the public of which one is a part, to think and act in
agreement within opinion, becomes all the more strong and irresistible
as the public becomes more numerous, the opinion more imposing and
the need itself more often satisfied” (1969, p. 318).
What is missing here is any sense of the power asymmetries built
into this mediazation (cf. Thompson, 1995, p. 46) of the social. It is here
that ANT’s skepticism provides the necessary critical distance, even if it
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may be expressed hyperbolically in terms of a questioning of “the social”
itself. So Callon and Latour describe the project of ANT as “directing our
attention not to the social but towards the processes by which an actor
creates lasting asymmetries” (1981, pp. 285-286). This insight is vital in
getting a perspective on media. Media institutions, whatever the perva-
siveness of their reach and however responsive they are to their audi-
ences, remain the beneficiaries of huge and lasting asymmetries in the
distribution of symbolic resources. The idea of media power is, of
course, a commonplace, but its analysis has been bedeviled by the com-
plex two-way nature of the interactions between media institutions and
the rest of the social world (whether in terms of social inputs to media
production or in the contribution of media productions to social experi-
ence and norms). It is ANT that provides us with the most precise lan-
guage to formulate how this complex flow nonetheless represents a dis-
tinctive form of power. For media institutions, however responsive to
audiences and the cultural world around them, remain the “obligatory
passing points” (Callon & Latour, 1981, p. 287; cf. Callon, 1986, p. 27) in
many, even most, circuits of communication. This is at least a good
starting point for an analysis of media power that avoids functionalism
and remains fixed on the materiality of flows to, through, and from
media institutions (cf. Couldry, 2000, chaps. 1, 2, and 3).
So far I have argued that ANT remains important to media theory
as an inspiration to orientate ourselves towards certain approaches to
media theory and away from others. As an effective antidote to function-
alism, it should stay in our theoretical tool kit. But can ANT be more
than this and offer the basis for a more comprehensive theory of media
in all its dimensions?
THE LIMITS OF ACTOR NETWORK THEORY
APPLIED TO MEDIA
In this section we will see that there are important constraints on ANT’s
usefulness as a general theory of how media contribute to social expe-
rience and social organization. The constraints derive from limitations
of ANT itself as an attempt to understand human action, as already sug-
gested in the earlier quotation from Roger Silverstone. These limits are,
however, not fatal, and towards that end I want to argue that, provided
we step aside from its grandiose claims to be a total and radically
rethought account of social action, ANT can be an important part of the
panoply of media theory.
So far I have expressed the advantages of ANT in terms of its anti-
functionalism and its general skepticism about essentialized notions of
the social, the technical, the cultural, and so on. ANT’s value for under-
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standing media can also be expressed more directly in terms of its pre-
dominant emphasis on space. ANT’s appreciation of the spatial dimen-
sion of power—the spatial dispersal of power and the instantiation of
power not in mysterious substances located at particular points and in
particular individuals, but in the workings of stretched-out networks—
derives of course from Foucault’s reconceptualization of power (Callon
& Latour, 1981; Foucault, 1980). ANT’s double connection to space and
Foucault helps further explain the apparently paradoxical disconnection
between ANT and most existing media theory: for it is precisely the spa-
tial dimension of media power that has been long neglected and whose
neglect, in turn, explains the relative absence until recently of
Foucauldian social theory in accounts of media power (but see now
Mattelart, 1996). Yet the neglect of space is clearly unsustainable for an
account of media as complex connectivity. As Anna McCarthy and I have
argued elsewhere:
Understanding media systems and institutions as spatial processes
undercuts the infinite space of narrative that media appear to prom-
ise; it insists that our object of analysis is never just a collection of
texts, but a specific and material organisation of space. Media, like
all social processes, are inherently stretched out in space in partic-
ular ways, and not others. . . . Media, then, emerge as one of the
most important of all displacements at work in the relatively cen-
tralised “order” of contemporary societies. (Couldry & McCarthy,
2004, pp. 2-4)
Inevitably, however, ANT’s spatial virtue is connected with a limitation,
which is ANT’s relative neglect of time, at least as a dynamic process
that continues to transform networks after they have been formed. At
one level, it is incorrect to say that ANT neglects time. Considered from
the point of view of the set of actants that come to form a particular net-
work, ANT helps us understand the significance of time in two ways:
first, in terms of how the coordination of actors around certain chains
of action inevitably involves temporal coordination (whether in the sub-
mission of experimental results according to laboratory schedules or
the production of accounting information to enable the pricing of elec-
tricity supply); time is inseparable from the coordination of sequences
of actions in networks. Secondly, time features in typical ANT explana-
tions in terms of how networks come to be established as normal, reg-
ular, and, gradually, as natural. This is the basis of ANT’s profound
insight about naturalization that, although not unique to ANT (it is cen-
tral also to the work of Pierre Bourdieu) is especially relevant to an
understanding of media’s social dynamics, as we shall see. As Latour
and Woolgar put it in Laboratory Life, “the result of the construction
[italics added] of a fact is that it appears unconstructed by anyone”
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(1979, p. 240). ANT therefore disrupts the sociology of knowledge by
emphasizing both spatial and temporal asymmetries at least to the
point where facts get established. Even better, Callon and Latour (1981)
leave open, at least in theory, the possibility that facts are reversible
and the “black boxes” (that is, the actors such as scientific or media
institutions inside which lie collections of hidden networks) may be
pried open.
The problem, however, is that ANT remained much more interested
in the establishment of networks than in their later dynamics. The clo-
sure involved in the establishment of a network is real, but how does it
help us understand how a network changes and perhaps becomes
destabilized? The answer is that it doesn’t—at least not without an addi-
tion to the theory. Whereas ANT’s bias towards the achievement of
actor-networks may be refreshing in its boldness, the overall result of
work in this area is, as Barry Barnes has argued, to skew the field of
analysis towards a narrative of success (what he calls a “mock-heroic
history”: 2001, p. 344). Worse, what is celebrated is limited to an
account of human agency as extended by technological networks:
For all that at one level actor-network theory modestly follows the
actors and marks no distinction of its own between humans and
things, at another level it is a profoundly intrusive monism engaged
in the celebration of human agency. (2001, p. 344)
ANT is interested in the celebration of human agency in terms of its
entanglement with technology, and not any other dimensions of human
agency—all this, in spite of the fact that from other perspectives net-
works are at most the infrastructure of human action, not its dynamic
content.
One problem, then, of building ANT into a fuller account of media is
its neglect of time, or rather its concentration on one type of temporal
dynamic and historical achievement, at the expense of others. This first
limitation is linked to a second: ANT’s neglect of the long-term conse-
quences of networks for the distribution of social power. Once again this
is not an absolute neglect, but rather a matter of emphasis, which
nonetheless is consistent and whose silences are unsatisfactory. As we
saw in the last section, ANT offers a precise and nonfunctionalist
account of how actors become established as powerful through the sta-
bility of the networks that pass through them. The actor (human or non-
human) that is an obligatory passing-point in a network has power, and
the more networks in which that is true, the more power that actor has.
As a result, over time, the ability of an actor to act effectively on a larg-
er scale becomes established. Although it requires much further work
(cf. Couldry, 2003b), there is the basis here for a useful account of how
media institutions have gradually acquired power over large territories
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through their incremental insertion in an increasingly dense web of
communication circuits.
What limits the usefulness of ANT as a research tradition for media
analysis and social analysis generally is its relative lack of interest in
the long-term power consequences of networks’ establishment for
social space as a whole and its equality or inequality. For all its intellec-
tual radicalism, ANT comes charged with a heavy load of political con-
servatism that is, I would argue, directly linked to its professed disinter-
est in human agency. Power differentials between human actors matter
in a way that power differentials (if that is the right term) between non-
humans do not: they have social consequences that are linked to how
these differences are interpreted and how they affect the various
agents’ ability to have their interpretations of the world stick. ANT has
much to contribute to understanding the “how” of such asymmetries,
but it is strangely silent when it comes to assessing whether, and why,
they matter. Its deconstruction of the humanist subject is here dis-
abling—nor is this surprising, because this is precisely the paradox of
value at the crux of Foucault’s work, as many have argued (Best &
Kellner, 1991, pp. 64-65; Taylor, 1986), and, as noted, it is on Foucault’s
intellectual legacy that ANT is built. MacGregor Wise’s criticism of
ANT’s neglect of both wider power structures and of possibilities of
resistance to and contestation of them is therefore well placed
(MacGregor Wise, 1997, pp. 31-39). Because media are quite clearly a
major dimension of contemporary power structures and also a zone of
intense contestation, the limits of ANT as the basis for a general critical
theory of media are clear.
These first two limitations share a common pattern: ANT’s initial
insights into a dimension of social order (spatiality of networks, power
asymmetries) are not developed for a network’s longer-term conse-
quences for social space and its implications for power. This suggests a
third limitation on ANT’s usefulness for a general theory of media,
which concerns interpretation: its lack of interest in the possibility that
networks and their products go on being reinterpreted long after they
have been established. This is an especially important problem in rela-
tion to networks that produce objects whose main purpose is to gener-
ate interpretations (such as media). Once again, ANT was pathbreaking
in showing how processes that apparently are purely material (the pro-
duction of cars or the distribution of electricity) depend crucially on
interpretations and contests over interpretation by various actors, and
how certain interpretations come to acquire dominance as their picture
of the world gets hardwired into the patterning of action. However, this
tells us little about the life of objects, such as texts, that are produced to
be interpreted, nor about how other objects, as they circulate beyond
their original context, remain to various degrees open to reinterpreta-
tion by uses, consumers, and audiences. This takes us back to
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Silverstone’s criticism of ANT, discussed earlier, that it tries to exclude
the social process in a way that is impossible, ignoring a large part of
how material processes and infrastructures come to have meaning for
us. One could equally say that ANT seeks to exclude culture, the realm
of symbolic production, except insofar as it contributes to the putting in
place of stable networks of actors. If so, ANT cannot tell us enough to
generate a broader theory of media.
This becomes even clearer when we look at a rare case which ANT
has attempted to discuss not technology but culture (Gomert & Hennion,
1999). Gomert and Hennion’s essay, A Sociology of Attachment: Music
Amateurs, Drug Users, argues that ANT opens up a new approach to
cultural production and cultural engagement. This derives from ANT’s
serious interest in mediation. ANT, Gomert and Hennion argue, moves
beyond the analysis of the actions of single human actors to study the
action-events that emerge from networks. The competences of actors
cannot be understood in an individualistic way but rather “are shaped
by the social and material organization of work, the lay-out of . . . insti-
tutions, the means of communication” (Gomert & Hennion, 1999, p.
224). All this is developed in ANT without treating “action” by human
agents as the main unit of analysis. Instead ANT is able to look more
openly at the processes that are really significant: “what happens only
sometimes [italics added] takes the form of an action that may be dis-
tributed to circumscribed sources” (1999, p. 225). This, in fact, is what
Gomert and Hennion mean by mediation: “Mediation is a turn towards
what emerges, what is shaped and composed, what cannot be reduced
to an intersection of causal objects and intentional persons” (1999, p.
226). One example is the emergence of the passion that the music lover
feels for music, which, as they point out, cannot be reduced to a simple
relation between actor (the music lover) and object (the musical text):
“From a long set of mediations (scores, instruments, gestures and bod-
ies, stages and mediums) at certain moments, on top of it all, something
might happen” (1999, p. 245). This is an almost mystical evocation of
the emergence of musical experience out of a complex chain of media-
tions and connections. But its lyricism exposes the fact that ANT, as a
theory of networks between human and nonhuman actors, has very lit-
tle to say about processes that come after the establishment of net-
works: what comes after—the acts of interpretation and attachment—
becomes mysterious because, by definition, it cannot be encompassed in
an account of how the broad infrastructures of actors and objects (on
which, to be sure, it depends) have emerged.
This is not to say that we can learn nothing from ANT about how,
for example, music lovers or film lovers understand what they do, but
rather that ANT’s insights must be extended from a sociology of net-
works into what Gomert and Hennion seem to want to avoid—a sociol-
ogy of action and interpretation. We need, in other words, to think about
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how people’s cognitive and emotive frameworks are shaped by the
underlying features of the networks in which they are situated. If
expressed in these terms, there is a great deal to be learned from ANT
in understanding everyday practices around media.
The starting point is that, at the macro level, a medium such as tel-
evision can be understood as a huge networked space characterized by
a fundamental division between producers of meaning (i.e., those
acknowledged as such: media institutions and particular actors within
them) and consumers of meaning (audiences). It is not that those who
work for media institutions are not also consumers of meaning or that
audiences do not produce meanings (as audiences research has long
emphasized they do), but rather that the space of television is organized
so that only under specific and controlled conditions are audience
meanings channeled back to media institutions so that they count as
meaning production, and even then they remain subordinate to the pro-
ductions of media institutions. Many of the paradoxes and tensions in
how media institutions treat the people who are their audiences can be
formulated in the terms that the ANT theorist John Law used to explain
the production of knowledge: the “modes of ordering” which position
certain types of practices as expert practices and “the relatively consis-
tent pattern of deletion”, which disempowers other practices (cf.
Couldry, 2000, p. 49; Law, 1994, pp. 110-111). Hall’s early (1973) but
seminal analysis of how particular people are systematically overac-
cessed in the production of media narratives, whereas others by the
same token are systematically underaccessed, fits well with the lan-
guage of ANT because it is an attempt to dig beneath the regularities in
how media link particular agents and objects into their production
process and not others.
This explains why, at the outset, I insisted we should not follow
Silverstone in dismissing the insights of ANT as a blind alley in the
search for a wider theory of media. On the contrary, ANT offers funda-
mental insights into the spatiality of networks and into the nature of
contemporary power formations, particularly the way important asym-
metries of power get hardwired into the organization of action and
thought so that they become, precisely, difficult to see and articulate as
power. This is a vital starting point for understanding the consequences
of media for social and cultural experience. The difficulty is to overcome
ANT’s self-imposed limitations as a sociology of networks and make the
necessary connections to a sociology of action. If we consider media as
a distinctive social process that links producers and audiences in a reg-
ular set of relationships for the production and consumption of meaning
in particular time cycles across large territories, then the organization
of those relationships, and particularly their asymmetries, must have
consequences for how both media producers and audiences think about
their possibilities of action. My own view is that to make progress here
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we need to look elsewhere in the history of French social thought and
draw on Emile Durkheim, particularly as reworked by Pierre Bourdieu.
We need Durkheim’s notion of social categories, and Bourdieu’s notion
of habitus. This is a line of argument that I have tried to develop through
work on people’s general orientations to the media process and ritual-
ized aspects of media (Couldry, 2000, 2003a). There is a great deal more
work to be done, but ANT remains a useful inspiration. In the next sec-
tion, I want to illustrate this point through a brief consideration of the
familiar concept of liveness from the point of view of networks.
LIVENESS AS CONNECTEDNESS
The term “liveness” has long been recognized in media discourse and in
academic writing on media as a central feature of television and certain
other media. Television, for example, prides itself on its “live” moments.
This quality of television has generally been analyzed in terms of the
properties of the televisual text, which characterize liveness. In fact,
however, liveness is best understood as a term that stands in for the
optimal connectedness of which the usual network between television
producers and audiences is capable. As I have argued elsewhere (cf.
Bourdon, 2000; cf. Couldry, 2003a, p. 99), liveness is a category that
naturalizes the idea that through the media we achieve shared attention
to the realities that matter for us as a society. The special status given
to live media can therefore be understood in actor-network terms as the
time when media’s status as mediation is most effectively black-boxed,
because of the direct link to events as they happen. Liveness is, in effect,
a network value, and it is a value whose applicability across media is
increasing (to the Internet, for example).
There is much more that could be said about how liveness works as
a category in relation to everyday media, but instead I want to bring out
how liveness’s categorical weight is now under challenge by other forms
of connection that are not linked to a media production center in the
same way. We are entering a period in which there is likely to be a
dynamic interplay between different modes of liveness and the differ-
ently organized networks for which they stand.
Two fundamental shifts in information and communications tech-
nologies in the past decade threaten, prima facie, to destabilize liveness
in the sense it has been usually understood until now.
The first is what we could call online liveness: social copresence on a
variety of scales from very small groups in chatrooms to huge interna-
tional audiences for breaking news on major websites, all made possible
by the Internet as an underlying infrastructure. Often, online liveness
overlaps with the existing category of liveness; for example, websites
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linked to reality TV programs such as Big Brother that simply offer an
alternative outlet for material that could in principle have been broadcast
on television, if there had been an audience to justify it. Online liveness
here is simply an extension of traditional liveness across media, not a new
way of coordinating social experience. Any number of live transmissions
can occur online in parallel without interfering with each other, all of
them involving the simultaneous copresence of an audience, but in some
cases (e.g. website chatrooms) there is often no liveness in the tradition-
al sense, because there is no plausible connection to a centre of transmis-
sion. Whether the Internet will, in the longer term, lead to a fragmenta-
tion of any sense of a center of transmission remains uncertain, although
much, including the Internet’s capacity to deliver advertising audiences to
fund continued media production, will depend on this.
The second rival form of liveness we might call group liveness, but
it would not seem, at first sight, to overlap at all with traditional live-
ness, because it starts from the copresence of a social group, not the
copresence of an audience dispersed around an institutional center. I
mean here, for example, the liveness of a mobile group of friends who
are in continuous contact via their mobile phones through calls and tex-
ting. Peer-group presence is, of course, hardly new, but its continuous
mediation through shared access to a communications infrastructure,
whose entry-points are themselves mobile and therefore can be perma-
nently open, is new. It enables individuals and groups to be continuous-
ly copresent to each other even as they move independently across
space. This transformation of social space may override individuals’
passage between sites of fixed media access, as when school friends
continue to text each other when they get home, enter their bedrooms,
and switch on their computers. As well as being a significant extension
of social group dynamics, group liveness offers to the commercial inter-
ests that maintain the mobile telephony network an expanded space for
centralized transmission of news, services, and advertising.
What is particularly interesting about the case of mobile telephony
is that the same communications space can be the vehicle for two quite
different networks, one centralized (for advertising and news transmis-
sion purposes) and the other person-to-person, but both in some sense
characterized by liveness. Clearly, in the longer term, the meaning of the
term liveness may be determined by the different meanings and values
given to these rival forms of connection.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that the relationship between ANT and media theory is a
significant, if uneasy, one. On the one hand, there are important reasons
why ANT cannot offer a total theory of media: these are its insufficient
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attention to questions of time, power and interpretation. On the other
hand, there are important reasons why ANT should be an important
part of the media theorist’s tool kit. The divergence of ANT and media
sociology in the early 1990s, and their relative disconnection from each
other, is therefore unfortunate, because ANT remains an important
antidote to functionalist versions of media theory and an inspiration
towards developing better versions of a materialist approach to under-
standing what media are and their consequences for the social world
and social space.
That this hasn’t happened so far is due, perhaps in part, to ANT’s
political quietism and its excessive hostility to any notion of the social.
ANT was right to see that any account of the social that closed its eyes
to the social embedding of technology was doomed, but wrong to close
down the possibilities of how we might think about the relationship
between social and technological to questions of network coordination.
In a recent essay, Karin Knorr-Cetina (herself a social theorist with
affinity to ANT) has tried to formulate these questions in a more open
way in terms of a rethinking of social order that does not rely on notions
of social substance (Knorr-Cetina, 2001). The role of technologies such
as media in organising forms of attachment and belonging can be ana-
lyzed without abandoning our interest in social interaction and its
dynamics. Knorr-Cetina’s suggestion that we consider computer pro-
grams, investment vehicles, and fashion designs (she could easily have
added radio phone-ins and lifestyle TV programs) as “unfolding struc-
tures of absences” (2001, p. 527) is striking. This captures both the pat-
terned, highly routinized nature of how media contribute to the social
world and media’s imaginative openness. Crucially, Knorr-Cetina raises
the question of interpretation and representation ignored by ANT: we
must think, she argues, about “the pervasiveness of the images them-
selves in a media and information society” and their contribution to
what now passes for social order. This is to take on the challenge that
media power provides to our understanding of the social, but be ready
to admit that this challenge, as yet, remains unsolved:
The retraction of [traditional] social principles leaves no holes . . . in
the fabric of cultural patterns. There has been no loss of texture for
society, though what the texture consists of may need rethinking.
(2001, p. 527)
In trying to avoid the question of the social through the fix of a reified
notion of networks as technical-social hybrids, ANT offered a premature
closure of what remain interesting and open issues. But that, as I have
argued, is no reason to lose interest in ANT within media theory, for it
can still inspire us, even as we push its insights in other directions and
over different territory from that which it originally set for itself.
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